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ABSTRACT
The design of authentication protocols, for online banking
services in particular and any service that is of sensitive na-
ture in general, is quite challenging. Indeed, enforcing secu-
rity guarantees has overhead thus imposing additional com-
putation and design considerations that do not always meet
usability and user requirements. On the other hand, relax-
ing assumptions and rigorous security design to improve the
user experience can lead to security breaches that can harm
the users’ trust in the system.
In this paper, we demonstrate how careful visualization
design can enhance not only the security but also the us-
ability of the authentication process. To that end, we pro-
pose a family of visualized authentication protocols, a vi-
sualized transaction verification, and a “decryptable to your
eyes only” protocol. Through rigorous analysis, we verify
that our protocols are immune to many of the challenging
authentication attacks applicable in the literature. Further-
more, using an extensive case study on a prototype of our
protocols, we highlight the potential of our approach for
real-world deployment: we were able to achieve a high level
of usability while satisfying stringent security requirements.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Communication Networks]: General –
Security and Protection; C.4 [Performance of Systems]:
Design studies
General Terms
Security, Design, Experimentation
Keywords
Authentication, Augmented Reality, Spyware, Malicious code,
Key Logger, Password, Smartphone
1. INTRODUCTION
Threats against the electronic and digital financial services
can be classified into two major classes of attacks: credential
∗Corresponding author. E-mail: mohaisen@cs.umn.edu
stealing attacks and channel breaking attacks [20]. Credentials—
such as users identifiers, passwords, and keys—can be stolen
by an attacker when they are poorly managed. For example,
a poorly managed personal computer (PC) infected with a
malicious software (malware) is an easy target for creden-
tial attackers [45, 41]. On the other hand, channel breaking
attacks—which allow for eavesdropping on communication
between users and a financial institution—are another form
of exploitation [22]. While classical channel breaking at-
tacks can be prevented by a proper usage of security channel
such as IPSec [14] and SSL (secure sockets layer) [38], re-
cent channel breaking attacks are more challenging. Indeed,
“shoulder-surfing” attacks—or those that utilize session hi-
jacking, phishing and pharming, visual fraudulence, and key
logging— cannot be addressed by data encryption.
Chief among this class of attacks are keyloggers [19, 41,
39]. A keylogger is software designed to capture all user’s
keyboard strokes and make use of them to impersonate a user
in financial transactions. For example, whenever a user types
in her password in a bank’s sign-in box, the keylogger in-
tercepts the password. The threat of malware is pervasive
and can be present both in personal computers and public
kiosks. There are cases where it is necessary to perform fi-
nancial transactions using a public computer. The biggest
concern is that a user’s password is likely to be stolen. Even
worse, keyloggers, often rootkitted, are hard to detect since
they will not show up in the task manager process list.
To mitigate the keylogger attack, a virtual keyboard or
an onscreen keyboard with random keyboard arrangement
has been introduced. Rearranging alphabets randomly on
the keycaps can frustrate simple keyloggers. Unfortunately,
the keylogger software, which has the control over the en-
tire PC, can easily capture every event and read the video
buffer to create a mapping between the clicks and the new
alphabet. Another approach is to use the keyboard hooking
prevention technique by perturbing the keyboard interrupt
vector table [37]. However, this technique is not universal
and can interfere with the operating system and native de-
vice drivers. Also, there is another avenue for event hooking
bypassing this defense rendering it ineffective.
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Considering that the keylogger sees user’s keystroke, this
attack is quite similar to the shoulder-surfing attack. To pre-
vent the shoulder-surfing attack, many graphical password
schemes have been introduced [15, 18, 27], but many of
them are not usable in the sense that they are quite compli-
cated for a person to utilize them. However, the usability is
as important as the security, because users tend not to change
their online transaction experience for higher security.
It is not enough to depend only on cryptographic tech-
niques to prevent attacks which aim to deceive user’s vi-
sual experience. Even if all necessary information is se-
curely delivered to a user’s computer, the attacker residing
on a user’s computer can easily observe and alter the infor-
mation and show a valid-looking yet deceiving information.
Human user’s involvement in the security protocol is nec-
essary sometimes to prevent this type of attacks, but human
is not good at complicated calculations and does not have
a good memory to remember cryptographically-strong keys
and signatures. Thus, the usability is an important factor in
designing a human-involving protocol [22].
Our direction to solving the problem is to introduce an
intermediate device that bridges a human user and a termi-
nal. Then, instead of the user directly invoking the regular
authentication protocol, he/she invokes a more sophisticated
but user-friendly protocol via the intermediate helping de-
vice. Every interaction between the user and an interme-
diate helping device is visualized using a Quick Response
(QR) visual code. The goal is to avoid any memorization,
perform any complex calculations, or even extensive typing.
More specifically, our approach visualizes the security pro-
cess of authentication using a smartphone-aided augmented
reality. The visual involvement of users in a security proto-
col boosts both the security of the protocol and is re-assuring
to the user because he feels that he plays a role in the pro-
cess. To securely implement visualized security protocols,
a smartphone with a camera is used. Instead of executing
the entire security protocol on the personal computer, part of
security protocol is moved to the smartphone. The user in-
put is entered via the smartphone as are further interactions,
when necessary. This visualization of some part of security
protocols enhances the security greatly and offers protection
against hard-to-defend attacks such as malicious ware and
shoulder surfing attack, while not degrading the usability.
1.1 Scope and contributions
In this paper, we demonstrate how visualization can en-
hance not only the security but also the usability. We do
so by proposing a family of visualized authentication proto-
cols, visualized transaction verification, and a “decryptable
to your eyes only” protocol. Through rigorous analysis, we
show that our protocols are immune to many of the chal-
lenging attacks applicable to other protocols in the literature.
Furthermore, using an extensive case study on a prototype
of our protocols, we highlight the potential of our protocols
in real-world deployment meeting users shortcomings and
limitations. The original contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• Three protocols of authentication that utilize visualiza-
tion by means of augmented reality to provide both
high security and high usability. We show that these
protocols are secure under several real-world attacks,
including keyloggers, malwares, and shoulder-surfer;
three attacks that are known to be challenging on au-
thentication protocols.
• A novel protocol for transaction verification paired with
a protocol for secure transaction processing. Both pro-
tocols offer advantages due to visualization both in terms
of security and usability.
• A prototype implementation in the form of an Android
application which demonstrates the usability of our pro-
tocols in real-world deployment settings.
We note that our protocols are generic and can be applied
to many contexts of authentication. For example, a plausi-
ble scenario of deployment could be when considering the
terminal in our system as an ATM (Automated Teller Ma-
chine), public PC, among others. Furthermore, our design
does not require explicit channel between the bank and the
smartphone, which is desirable in some contexts; the smart-
phone can be replaced by any device with the needed func-
tionality (see section 2 for more details).
1.2 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2
we review the system, trust, and attacker model used in this
paper. In section 3, we review three novel authentication
protocols. In section 4 we extended the presentation of these
protocols by discussing several implementation and design
issues. In section 5 we analyze the security of our proto-
cols under several potential attacks. In section 6 we report
several experiments and user studies to support the usability
of our protocols. In section 7 we review related work from
the literature. In section 8 we draw concluding remarks and
point out several future work directions.
2. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
In this section we describe the system and threat models
suitable to understand the work in the rest of this paper.
2.1 System Model
Our system model consists of four different entities (or
participants), which are a user, a smartphone, a user’s termi-
nal, and a server. The user is an ordinary human, limited by
all human’s limitations and shortcomings, including limited
capabilities of performing complex computations or remem-
bering sophisticated cryptographic credentials. With a user’s
terminal such as a desktop computer or a laptop, the user
can log in a server of a financial institute (bank) for financial
transactions. After a successful login by proving possession
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of valid credentials, the user can do financial transactions
such as money transfer and bill payment. Also, the user
has a smartphone, the third system entity, which is equipped
with a camera, stores a public key certificate of the server for
digital signature verification. Also, the smartphone stores a
public/private key pair of the user, so if there is a channel
of communication between the server and the smartphone,
a secure channel can be established. Finally, the server is
the last system entity, which belongs to the financial insti-
tute and performs back-end operations by interacting with
the user (terminal or smartphone) on behalf of the bank.
Assuming a smartphone entity in our system is not a far-
fetched assumption, since most nowadays cell phones qual-
ify (in terms of processing and imaging capabilities) to the
device used in our work. In our system, we assume that
there is no direct channel between the server and the smart-
phone. Also, we note that in most of the protocols proposed
in this paper, a smartphone does not use the communication
channel—unless otherwise is explicitly stated—so a smart-
phone can be replaced by any device with a camera and some
proper processing power such as a camera and a portable
music player with camera (iPod touch, or mobile gadget with
the aforementioned capabilities).
2.2 Trust and Attacker Models
For the trusted entities in our system, we assume the fol-
lowing. First, we assume that the channel between the server
and the user’s terminal (or simply PC) is secured with an
SSL connection, which is in fact a very realistic assumption
in most settings of electronic banking systems. Second, we
assume that the server is secured by any means and is im-
mune to every attack by the attacker; hence the attacker’s
concern is not breaking the server but attacking the user. Fi-
nally, with respect to the keylogger attack, we assume that
the keylogger always resides on the terminal. As for the at-
tacker model, we assume a malicious attacker with high in-
centives of breaking the security of the system. We assume
that the attacker can do any or both of the following.
• The attacker has a full control over the terminal. Thus,
– While residing in a user’s terminal, the attacker
can capture user’s credentials such as a password,
a private key, and OTP (one time pad) token string.
– The attacker can deceive a user by showing a genuinely-
looking page that actually transfers money to the
attacker’s account with the captured credentials
that she obtained from the compromised terminal.
– Or, just after a user successfully gets authenti-
cated with a valid credential, the attacker can hi-
jack the authenticated session.
• The attacker is capable of creating a fake server which
she can use to launch phishing or pharming attacks.
For the smartphone, we assume that it is always trusted
and immune to compromise. It is however noted that relax-
ing this assumption would provide certain security guaran-
tees depending on the protocol. For example, the assump-
tion in protocol 1 that uses two factors can be relaxed so as
not only the terminal but also smartphone is compromised
(one of them at a time but not both together). However, for
protocols 2 and 3, we restrict this scenario so as the smart-
phone is always trusted and no malware nor keyloggers can
be installed on it. Notice that this assumption is in line with
other assumptions made on the smartphone’s trustworthiness
when used in similar protocols to those presented in this pa-
per [32, 31, 36].
In our protocols, we also assume several cryptographic
primitives. For example, in all protocols, we assume that
users have pairs of public/private keys used for message sign-
ing and verification. In protocol 1 we assume users have
passwords used for their authentication. In protocol 2 we
assume that the server has the capability of generating one
time pads, used for authentication. Notice that these as-
sumptions are not far-fetched, since most banking services
use such cryptographic credentials. For example, with most
banking services, the use of digital certificates issued by the
bank is very common. Furthermore, the use of such crypto-
graphic credentials and maintaining them on a smartphone
does not require any technical background at the user side,
and is suited for wide variety of users. Further details on
these credentials and their use are explained along with the
specific protocol in this paper.
2.3 Linear and Matrix Barcodes
A barcode is an optical machine-readable representation
of data, and it is widely used in our daily life since it is at-
tached in every type of products for identification. In the
nutshell, barcodes are mainly two types: linear barcodes
and matrix (or two dimensional, also known as 2D) bar-
codes. While linear barcodes—shown in Figure 1(a)—have
a limited capacity, which depends on the coding technique
used and can range from 10 to 22 characters, 2D barcodes—
shown in Figure 1(b) and Figure 1(c)—have higher capac-
ity, which can be more than 7000 characters. For exam-
ple, the QR (Quick Response) barcode [1]—a widely used
2D barcode—can hold 7,089 numeric, 4,296 alphanumeric,
and 2,953 binary characters [1], making it a very good high-
capacity candidate for storing plain and encrypted contents
alike.
Both linear and matrix barcodes are popular and have been
widely used in a lot of industries including, but not lim-
ited to, automotive industries, manufacturing of electronic
components, and bottling industries, among many others.
Thanks to their greater capacity, matrix barcodes are even
proactively used for advertisement so that a user who has a
smartphone can easily scan them to get some detailed infor-
mation about advertised products. This model of advertisement—
and other venues of using these barcodes in areas that are in
touch with users—created the need for barcode’s scanners
developed specifically for smartphones. Accordingly, this
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led to the creation of many popular commercial and free
barcode scanners that are available for smartphones such
as iPhone and Andriod phones alike. This includes Red-
Laser [3], BarcodeScanner [8], ShopSavvy [5], QR App [2],
among others.
(a) Barcode (code 128)
(b) QR barcode (c) QR barcode
Figure 1: Three different barcodes encoding the state-
ment “Virtual reality”. (a) is a linear barcode (code 128),
and (b) and (c) are matrix barcodes (of the QR barcode
standard). While (b) encodes the plain text, (c) encodes
an encrypted version using the AES-256 encryption al-
gorithm in the cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode (note
this last code requires a password for decryption).
3. SECURE TRANSACTIONS WITH AUG-
MENTED REALITY
In this section we describe thee different protocols for user
authentication with augmented reality. Before getting into
the details of these protocols, we review the notations of al-
gorithms used in our system and these protocols as building
blocks. Our system utilizes the following algorithms:
• Encrk(·): an encryption algorithm which takes a key k
and a message M from set M and outputs a ciphertext
C in the set C.
• Decrk(·): a decryption algorithm which takes a cipher-
text C in C and a key k, and outputs a plaintext (or
message) M in the set M.
• Sign(·): a signature generation algorithm which takes
a private key SK and a message M from the set M,
and outputs a signature σ.
• Verf(·): a signature verification algorithm which takes
a public key PK and a signed message (M,σ), and
returns valid or invalid.
• QREnc(·): a QR encoding algorithm which takes a
string S in S and outputs a QR barcode.
• QRDec(·): a QR decoding algorithm which takes a QR
barcode and returns a string S in S.
Any signature scheme with provable security guarantees can
be used to serve the purpose of our system. For details on the
notion of signatures security see [16]. In particular, and for
efficiency reasons, we recommend the short signature in [9].
3.1 An Authentication Protocol with Password
and Randomized Onscreen Keyboard
Our first protocol, which is referred to as Protocol 1 in the
rest of this paper, makes use of the a password shared be-
tween the server and the user, and a randomized onscreen
keyboard. A high-level event-driven code describing the
protocol is shown in Figure 2. A further detailed descrip-
tion is as follows.
1. The user connects to the server and sends her ID.
2. The server checks the received ID to retrieve the user’s
public key (PKID) from the database. The server pre-
pares pi, a random permutation of a keyboard arrange-
ment, and encrypts it with the public key to obtain
EKBD = EncrPKID(pi). Then, it encodes the cipher-
text with QR encoder to obtainQREKBD = QREnc(EkID(pi)).
The server sends the result with a blank keyboard.
3. In the user’s browser, a QR barcode (QREKBD ) is dis-
played together with a blank keyboard. Because the
onscreen keyboard does not have any alphabet on it,
the user cannot input her password. Now, the user ex-
ecutes her smartphone application which first decodes
the QR barcode by applying QRDec(QREKBD ) to get
the ciphertext (EKBD). The ciphertext is then decrypted
by the smartphone application with the private key of
the user to display (pi = DecrSKID (EKBD)) on the
smartphone’s screen.
4. When the user sees the blank keyboard with the QR
barcode through an app on the smartphone that has a
private key or a shared secret, alphabets and numbers
appear on the blank keyboard and the user can click the
proper keycap for the password. User clicks his/her
password on the computer monitor while seeing the
keyboard layout through the smartphone.
5. Server checks whether the password is correct or not.
Message signing. For the generality of the purpose of this
protocol and the following protocols, and to prevent the ter-
minal from misrepresenting the contents generated by the
server, one can establish the authenticity of the server and
the contents generated by it by adding the following verifica-
tion process. When the server sends the random permutation
to the user, it signs the permutation using the server’s pri-
vate key and the resulting signature is encoded in a QR code.
Before decrypting the contents, the user establishes the au-
thenticity of the contents verifying the signature against the
server’s public key. Both steps are performed using the Sign
and Verf algorithms. Verification is performed by the smart-
phone so as to avoid any man-in-the-middle attack by the
terminal.
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01: user::user.send(server, id)
02: server::__upon_id_arrival:
03: if(server.verify(id) == true):
04: pkid = server.db.find(id)
05: pi = server.generate_random_kb()
06: ekbd = server.encrypt(pkid, pi)
07: qrekbd = server.qrencode(ekbd)
08: server.send(user, qrekbd)
09: terminal::__upon_qrekbd_arrival:
10: terminal.view(qrekbd)
11: terminal.view_blank_kb(pi)
12: smartphone::__upon_qrekbd_view:
13: qrekbd = smartphone.capture(qrekbd)
14: ekbd = smartphone.qrdecode(qrekbd)
15: pi = smartphone.decrypt(skid, ekbd)
16: smartphone.view(pi)
17: user::__upon_pi_view:
18: pw = user.inputpassword(terminal)
19: terminal::upon_pw_input:
20: terminal.send(server, pw)
21: server::__upon_pw_arrival:
22: if(server.verify(id, pw) == true):
23: server.authenticate(user)
24: else:
25: server.deny(user)
Figure 2: Event-driven high-level description of the au-
thentication protocol with password and a randomized
onscreen blank keyboard (protocol 1).
3.2 Authentication With Random Strings
In this section we introduce an alternative protocol to that
explained in the previous section. The following protocol
(referred to as Protocol 2 in the the rest of the paper) re-
lies on a strong assumption; it makes use of a random string
for authentication. A high-level event-driven code describ-
ing the protocol is shown in Figure 3. A further detailed
description is as follows.
1. The user connects to the server and sends her ID.
2. Th server checks the ID to retrieve the user’s public
key (PKID) from the database. The server then picks
a fresh random string OTP and encrypts it with the
public key to obtain EOTP = EncrPKID(OTP ).
3. In the user’s browser, the QR barcode is displayed and
the page prompts the user to type in the string.
4. The user decodes the QR barcode. Because the random
string is encrypted with user’s public key (PKID), the
user can read the OTP string only through her smart-
phone and type in the OTP with a physical keyboard.
5. The server checks the result and if it matches with what
the server has sent earlier, the user is authenticated.
Otherwise, the user is denied.
3.3 Authentication Using Visual Channel for
Smartphone-to-Terminal Communication
Our last protocol, referred to as protocol 3 in the rest of
the paper, takes advantage of the visual channel between the
smartphone and the terminal. In this protocol, we further
assume that the terminal is provided with a camera, which
is not a far-fetched assumption. Equipped with a camera, a
01: user::user.send(server, id)
02: server::__upon_id_arrival:
03: if(server.verify(id) == true):
04: pkid = server.db.find(id)
05: otp = server.generate_otp()
06: eotp = server.encrypt(pkid, otp)
07: qreotp = server.qrencode(eotp)
08: server.send(user, qreotp)
09: terminal::__upon_qreotp_arrival:
10: terminal.view(qreotp)
11: terminal.view_kb()
12: smartphone::__upon_qreotp_view:
13: qreotp = smartphone.capture(qreotp)
14: eotp = smartphone.qrdecode(qreotp)
15: otp = smartphone.decrypt(skid, eotp)
16: smartphone.view(pi)
17: user::__upon_kb_view:
18: otp = user.inputotp(terminal)
19: terminal::upon_otp_input:
20: terminal.send(server, otp)
21: server::__upon_otp_arrival:
22: if(server.verify(id, otp) == true):
23: server.authenticate(user)
24: else:
25: server.deny(user)
Figure 3: Event-driven description of the authentication
protocol with one-time pad (OTP) tokens (protocol 2).
terminal can easily receive the user’s input from the smart-
phone via the QR barcode and forward it to the server. At
terminal, a plugin that reads and decodes the QR barcode
and sends it to the server is installed in a web browser. A
high-level event-driven describing the protocol is shown in
Figure 4. A further detailed description is as follows.
1. The user connects to the server and receives a login
box with a QR-encoded random nonce N .
2. The user executes an application on the smartphone
which reads the nonce N and prompts the user to in-
put her ID and password (PW). After the user inputs
her ID and password on the smartphone, the applica-
tion will encrypt N , ID, the password, and the server’s
name with the server’s public key (PKSrv), where the
encryption algorithm is IND-CCA2 secure. The result-
ing ciphertext (EncrPKSrv (N, ID,PW, Srv)) is then
encoded to a QR barcode and displayed on the smart-
phone screen.
3. The user puts the QR barcode on the screen at the ter-
minal’s camera. The plugin reads and decodes the QR
barcode to extract the ciphertext of the encrypted cre-
dentials and nonce. The ciphertext is sent to server.
4. The server decrypts the ciphertext and checks the nonce,
ID and password and decided upon their validity whether
the user is authenticated or not.
The idea of using QR barcode on the phone’s screen as
an upload channel (from phone to terminal) can be used in
many other schemes [30]. Instead of using cellular network
for a phone to send the confirmation, we can use this QR
barcode-based channel from phone to a terminal.
The use of the visual channel to input encrypted creden-
tials from the smartphone to the terminal has an interesting
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01: user::user.connect(server)
02: server::__upon_user_connection:
03: nonce = server.generate_nonce()
04: qrnonce = server.qrencode(nonce)
05: server.send(user,qrnonce)
06: terminal::__upon_qrnonce_arrival:
07: terminal.view(qrnonce)
08: smartphone::__upon_qrnonce_view
09: qrnonce = smartphone.capture(qrnonce)
10: nonce = smartphone.qrdecode(qrnonce)
11: smartphone.view_loginbox()
12: user::__upon_loginbox_view:
13: (id, pw) = user.input_credentials()
14: smartphone::__upon_credentials_input:
15: encredentials = smartphone.encrypt(id, pw, nonce)
16: qrencredentials = smartphone.qrencode(encredentials)
17: smaprtphone.view_qrenc(qrencredentials)
18: terminal::__upon_qrenc_view:
19: qrencredentials = terminal.capture(qrencredentials)
20: encredentials = terminal.qrdecode(qrencredentials)
21: terminal.send(server, encredentials)
22: server::__upon_encredentials_arrival:
23: (id, pw, nonce) = server.decrypt(encredentials)
24: if(server.valid(user, nonce) = true)
25: if(server.check(id, pw) = true):
26: authenticate(user)
27: else:
28: deny(user)
29: else:
30: deny(user)
Figure 4: Event-driven high-level description of the
authentication protocol with visual channel for user-
terminal communication (Protocol 3).
security implication when considered in context. As it is
the case with using e-banking on untrusted terminals (say,
in public library) imagine that such terminal is infected with
a virus, or has a malware, which could be a keylogger that
stores the credentials if the user is to input them directly on
the terminal. If the user is to use the login credentials di-
rectly on the terminal, it is obvious that these credentials
will be compromised. On the other hand, if these creden-
tials are to be transferred using the visual channel between
the smartphone and the terminal, chances for logging these
credentials on the terminal by the keylogger are obsolete.
4. DISCUSSION
Some of the technical issues in the three protocols that
we have introduced in the previous section call for further
discussions and clarification. In this section, we elaborate on
how to handle several issues related to our protocols, such
as session hijacking, transaction verification, and securing
transactions.
4.1 Prevention of Session Hijacking
Even with secure authentication, an attacker controlling
entities in the system participating in the authentication process—
the terminal in particular—via a malware can hijack the au-
thentication session just immediately after a user inputs her
correct password or an OTP. To detect the session hijacking,
the smartphone—triggered by the user—may send transaction-
related information to the server via a side channel such as
the cellular network or the visual channel introduced in sec-
tion 3.3. Just after running the password input procedure in
section 3, the smartphone application may send additional
information on the user’s transaction request that is signed
by the smartphone’s private signing key and/or encrypted
with the server’s public key through cellular network. By
adding this step, a server can be sure that the critical trans-
action request from the user’s terminal is not altered.
4.2 Transaction Verification
Visual fraudulence, such as man-in-the-browser attack [25],
phishing attack [13], and the pharming attack [25, 11], is an
attack to show valid looking HTML pages, but to perform
some malicious behaviors either by malicious code in the
HTML page or by making user visit malicious sites. The vi-
sual fraudulence is quite effective and critical if conducted
in financial transaction scenarios. The nature of the visual
fraudulent attack is to deceive people’s view and thus it is not
easy to devise an effective and useable method to prevent it.
Also, situations are worse in practical contexts noting that
the malicious ware performing the man-in-the-browser at-
tack can be easily implemented in a form of a browser helper
object.
Assume that a given user is visiting a banking server and is
about to transfer money to other account. Even if the user’s
terminal is infected with some malicious ware or the user is
visiting a phishing site, she cannot recognize it easily, be-
cause the HTML page that the user is watching is visually
the same as the genuine page. Even when a bank server asks
the user to input credentials such as a password, a one time
password generated from a hardware token, and a certificate
based signature to confirm the transaction, the user is willing
to input her credentials as requested, and with the credential
information the attacker is able to prepare a valid transfer
request to her account. In this section, we show an effective
and useable approach to defeat these visual fraudulence with
the aid of a smartphone. Similar in essence to the previous
discussed protocols, our protocol for preventing the visual
fraudulence consists of the following:
1. The user sends an HTML page to request money trans-
fer, for instance. This page might include a receiver’s
account number, the amount of money to be transferred,
and the receiver’s name, etc.
2. The server responds with confirmation HTML page
along with a QR code that includes transaction infor-
mation and a digital signature of messages in the HTML
page. The page might include a code to prompt a user
to input credentials to confirm the order.
3. The user reviews the HTML page received from the
server then—with an application on her smartphone—
she takes a snapshot of the QR barcode.
4. The application on the smartphone decodes and ver-
ifies the digital signature over the attached message
with the server’s public key. If the signature is valid, it
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will show the message with a mark indicating the sig-
nature was verified. Otherwise, it will warn the user
with a mark indicating invalid signature. The mark
may be a background color (green on a valid signature
and red on an invalid one) or simple warning words.
5. The user checks if the message matches with the one
in the HTML page and the signature is verified. If it is
valid and correctly verified, the user continues to con-
firm the transaction by inputting her credential.
4.3 Securing Transactions
Financial transactions are usually secured by encrypting
all transaction-related information during the transmission.
In many cases, the encrypted information should be decrypted
at the terminal (user’s PC, most likely, or a PC at public
place) to be shown to the user. However, under the assump-
tion that there is a malware inside the terminal, the attacker
does not need to break the cipher, but is enough to read the
information after being correctly decrypted. The encrypted
channel is established just between the server and the user’s
terminal. To make transactions more secure, it is needed
to extend the encrypted channel beyond the user’s termi-
nal. Accordingly, instead of decrypting the ciphertext at the
user’s terminal, we will decrypt it at the smartphone. Steps
of securing the transaction include the following:
1. The server prepares an HTML document that has en-
crypted data and their corresponding QR barcodes. The
ciphertext is encrypted with the user’s public key.
2. At the user’s terminal, the document is shown but not
decrypted. The user executes an application on the
smartphone and sees through it the HTML page. The
application captures the QR barcodes in the HTML
document and then decodes and decrypts them. On
the smartphone’s screen, the HTML document with
decrypted information will be viewed.
The sensitive data might be transaction-related account num-
bers, balance, account holder’s name, and ID, among others.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the security of our scheme un-
der several attack scenarios and show how these attacks are
defended. In particular, we consider brute-forcing attacks,
keyloggers, malicious ware, and shoulder surfing attacks.
5.1 Key Space and Brute-Force Attacker
In our protocols, several stages include encryption of sen-
sitive information such as credentials, which are of inter-
est to the attacker (including the user ID, password, and
nonce generated by the server). In our prototype, and sys-
tem recommendations for wide use of our protocols, as well
as the description provide above for the different protocols,
we consider public key cryptography. Furthermore, we sug-
gest key length that provides good security guarantees. This
includes the use of RSA-2048, which is very infeasible to
attack using the most efficient brute-force attack. This ap-
plies to both encryption and signature algorithms used in the
protocols.
Notice that all public key cryptography in our protocols
(except for signing and verification) can be replaced by sym-
metric key cryptography, which is far more efficient (despite
that computations in our protocols are marginal). Further-
more, such replacement of cryptographic techniques will not
affect the security guarantees of our protocols if standard al-
gorithms and key length are used—e.g. AES 192, which is
infeasible to brute-force. In our prototype, we use the latter
symmetric key cryptography for securing communication.
5.2 Keyloggers
The keylogger is a small piece of malicious software that
logs all keystrokes input by the user, which could potentially
include authentication credentials, and forward them to the
attacker. This type of malware is popular and widely re-
ported in many contexts [45, 19, 41, 39, 21]. In our proto-
cols, input is expected by the user, and in every protocol one
or another type of input is required. Our protocols—while
designed with the limitations and shortcoming of users in
mind, and aim at easing the authentication process by means
of visualization—are aimed explicitly at defending against
the keylogger attacks. Here, we further elaborate on the po-
tential of using keyloggers as an attack and the way they
impact each of the three protocols. While we believe that
having a keylogger installed on the smartphone is hard to
achieve, we discuss when it is hypothetically possible and
show how this affects the security of our protocols. Narrow-
ing the discussion to the case where keyloggers can be only
installed on the terminal strengthens all of the arguments.
Protocol 1. In the first protocol, a randomized blank key-
board is posted on the terminal whereas another keyboard
with the alphanumerics on it is posted on the smartphone.
Because the protocol does not require a user any keyboard
input on the smart phone side, the protocol is immune against
the keylogger attack. User just checks the keyboard layout
on the phone and there is not input from a user. Obviously,
the terminal might be compromised, but the keylogger will
be able to only capture what keystrokes are used on blank
keyboard. Thus, the keylogger will not be able to know
which alphanumeric character is being used.
Protocol 2. Authentication in this protocol is solely based
on a random string generated by the server. The random
string is encrypted by the public key of the user, and verified
against her private key. The main objective of using OTP is
that it is for one time use. Accordingly, if the keylogger is
installed on the terminal, the attacker obviously will be able
to know the OTP but will not be able to reuse it for future
authentication. Alternatively, a keylogger installed on the
smartphone will not be able to log any credentials, since no
credentials are typed in. It is worth noting that the attacker
may try to block users from being authenticated and reuse
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the OTP immediately. In this case, mitigations explained in
section 4 can be used to remedy the attack.
Protocol 3. In the third protocol, authentication is estab-
lished based on credentials provided by the user on her smart-
phone. Accordingly, having a keylogger on the terminal will
not enable the attacker to obtain any credentials required for
authentication. On the other hand, if the keylogger is in-
stalled on the smartphone, a relatively far-fetched assump-
tion, the keylogger will be able to log the password and user
name. By themselves alone, however, both it is not sufficient
for the attacker to be authenticated since the successful au-
thentication requires additionally knowing the user’s private
key, which is necessary to obtain the nonce sent by the server
and to compute the authentication response.
5.3 Malicious Software (malware)
The term malware is generic, and is technically used to de-
scribe any type of code with malicious intentions, including
keyloggers. It is obvious that an attacker who successfully
compromised a smart phone that has a private key that is a
whole credential required to break the system in protocol 2
and 3 will be always successful to break the systems except
the protocol 1 that requires both password and private key.
5.4 Shoulder-Surfing Attacks
The shoulder surfing is a powerful attack in the context of
password-based authentication and human identification [44,
22, 28]. In this attack, the attacker tries to know credentials,
such as passwords or PINs (personal identification numbers)
by stealthily looking over the shoulder of a user inputting
these credentials into the systems. These attacks are power-
ful and efficient in crowded places.
In our first protocol, observing the terminal or the smart-
phone keyboard layout (on the smartphone screen) alone would
not reveal the credentials of the user. Observing both at
the same time in a shoulder surfing attack, and mapping
stroked keys on the terminal to those on the smartphone
screen would reveal the credentials of the user. However,
being able to successfully launch this attack is a non-trivial
task, and requires the attacker to be in a position very close
to the user, which would raise suspicions of the user.
One may argue that requiring user caution to the potential
of the shoulder-surfing attack contradicts the usability argu-
ments of our protocols we advocated in this paper. Espe-
cially, the opposing argument might sound appealing given
that an attacker might be equipped with vision-enhancing
devices, such as cameras, to improve chances of the attack.
In response, we argue two issues. First, to succeed in this
attack, the attacker needs to have a good resolution-camera,
and still be in proximity of the user, to capture passwords
being used. Second, users who are aware that the termi-
nal they are avoiding is potentially compromised would be
highly likely cautious for susceptible actions around them—
such as that in the first issue above, which does not thwart
the usability arguments we claim for our protocols.
Table 1: A comparison of the three protocols and their
resistance to different attacks when the terminal and the
smartphone are under control of the attacker.
Attack brute-force keyloggers malware surfer
Protocol 1: Onscreen randomized keyboard
Smartphone ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Terminal ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Protocol 2: OTP tokens
Smartphone ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
Terminal ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Protocol 3: Visual channels for authentication
Smartphone ✔ ✖ ✖ ✔
Terminal ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
In the second protocol, OTP tokens are used for authenti-
cations. OTP tokens are one-time used, providing high en-
tropy, and are human-unfriendly making them hard to re-
member and recall. Accordingly, a shoulder surfer would
not benefit from launching an attack by trying to observe
what the user at the terminal is inputting. Last, in the third
protocol input is performed at the smartphone, and shoulder
surfing on the terminal will not benefit the attacker. Same as
in the first protocol, the ability of successfully launching an
attack by shoulder-surfing would require the attacker to be
in very good proximity from the user, which would raise the
user’s suspicions about the intentions of the attacker.
5.5 Comparison
To sum up, we compare the three protocols and the way
they perform against several attacks. We consider the sce-
narios where the attacker has control over either the terminal
or smartphone—see above. The comparison is in Table 1.
6. IMPLEMENTATION AND USER STUDY
We developed a prototype of our protocols as an Android
application. The application can run on any smartphone with
Android OS [17] (version 2.2 or later). Our application uses
the UTF-8 standard [6] for the keyboard encoding, AES-192
encryption algorithm [23] (in the counter mode) for contents
encryption, Base64 encoding [24] for byte-to-character en-
coding of encrypted contents, and uses the Google API for
creating and reading the QR barcodes. For that, we particu-
larly use ZXing [7], an open source implementation for read-
ing several standards of the 1D and 2D barcodes. Snapshots
of the Android application, the terminal, and QR barcode in
the prototype that we developed are shown in Figure 5.
6.1 Settings and Basic Characteristics
In all of our experiments in this paper we used a Samsung
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(a) Terminal Keyboard (b) QR code (c) Smartphone Keyboard
Figure 5: Snapshots of the prototype we developed to demonstrate our authentication protocols. Fig. (a). shows the
blank keyboard posted at the terminal, where numerics are used to ease the process of input by the user. Fig. (b) shows
the QR barcode on the terminal as being captured and recognized by the smartphone application. Fig. (c) shows the
decoded randomized layout of the keyboard obtained from the QR barcode after decryption as viewed on smartphone.
Galaxy U smartphone [4], which has an S5PC111 proces-
sor operating at 1GHz, 512 MB of RAM, a Gingerbread OS
(Android OS 2.3), and a 5.0 Mega pixel camera with auto-
focus, geo-tagging, touch focus, and face and smile detec-
tion. To send encrypted data from the terminal to the smart-
phone conveniently, we adopted the QR barcode. However,
the camera on the phone is not error-free when it captures a
QR barcode, we need to correct errors at the time of decod-
ing. Fortunately, QR barcode has internal error correction
capability with Reed Solomon code. The rate of successful
decoding of QR barcodes is dependent upon multiple factors
such as a QR barcode size, the resolution of a camera and the
smartphone screen. Thus, the amount of data needed to exe-
cute our protocol is crucial to its feasibility.
If we use alphanumeric passwords only, the total num-
ber of possible keys in the onscreen keyboard is 36. So,
log
2
36! = 138 bit entropy is guaranteed which is high enough
for security. For the encoding of this permutation, we need
36× log
2
36 = 187 bits. But if we use alphanumeric encod-
ing of QR code, we need to store 36 alphanumeric charac-
ters. Considering that one QR barcode can hold up to 2953
binary characters (bytes), it is feasible to encode the key-
board arrangement in a QR barcode. More specifically, QR
barcode version 2 with M level error correcting capability
can hold 36 alphanumerics. So, even a relatively small ca-
pacity QR barcode with moderate error correcting code is
applicable. Accordingly, we can run our authentication pro-
tocols with a smartphone with a low-resolution camera and
screen. The rate of successful scanning and decoding of QR
challenges depends partly on the QR barcode size, and trans-
lates to higher screen time when failure happens.
To understand the impact the QR barcode size on the time
required for decoding the message using our application, we
run the following experiment. Using the same QR barcode
for the same encoded data, we generate QR barcodes with
different sizes (in pixel). We use 8 sizes, as shown in Fig-
ure 6. In all measurements, we demonstrate that the response
time of the QR scanner is well less than 3 sec. Furthermore,
for the majority of the cases, we obtain a response mean time
around 1.5 seconds, except when the QR barcode size is 100
pixel, which translates into an average of 1.75 seconds. This
measurement demonstrates the feasibility of our protocol’s
utilization of the QR barcodes for input and visualization.
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Figure 6: Boxplot of the different measurements of the
response time for different QR barcode size (in pixel, 20
measurements for each case). Note that the boxplot rep-
resents the 5%, 95% maximum, mean, first and second
quartiles of the time measurements. Notice the positive
association between the time and the code size.
6.2 User and Usability Study
To understand the usability aspects of our protocols, we
perform a user study in several settings. We asked 20 dif-
ferent users to use our system. We limit ourselves to a fully
functioning implementation of the first protocol. We note
that results reported in this study can be used as an upper
bound on the performance of our protocols, since other pro-
tocols require less user intervention than the first protocol.
We compare this case of our functioning protocol to two
control groups (ground truth) of usage. The first case study
considers the inputting method in typical devices using a
qwerty keypad on the screen to correspond to the response
time of typical password inputting time (without using our
protocols or their security guarantees). The second case is
the control group where we use a randomized keyboard on
the terminal, which is already used as a security mechanism
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(see section 1). Accordingly, in the second case users do
not need to map the randomized keyboard to a layout on the
terminal—they rather directly use the one on the terminal. In
both cases, the user enters his password using mouse clicks.
In all experiments, we use two password lengths 4 and 8
characters. Each user to use the password of his own choice.
We repeat the experiment with each user for 10 times. In the
following, we summarize the main results.
Case study 1—Control group (a). In the first case study
(referred to as normal experiment), we asked the 20 users
of our system to input passwords of their own choice with
the different lengths (4 and 8 characters) on a qwerty keypad
shown on the terminal . Input is done by mouse clicks. We
measure the response time of each user in both cases. We
repeat the experiment for 10 times for each user. We do the
measurements for all cases, including when passwords are
typed incorrectly. We find that the average success rate is
97% with 4 characters passwords and 91% for 8 characters
passwords. An empirical CDF of the time measurements
(total of 200) is shown in Figure 7 (the left figure is for 4
characters and the right figure is for the 8 characters case).
We find that the mean, min, max and median (in seconds)
are 4.21, 2, 29, and 4 when using 4 characters passwords
and 6.81, 2, 28, and 6 when using 8 characters.
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Figure 7: Empirical CDF of the time it takes for in-
putting passwords of two different lengths. The total
number of trials is 200 obtained from 20 users. The key-
board used for input is a qwerty keypad, which is the
typical Android phone keypad.
Case study 2—Control group (b). In the second experi-
ment (referred to as randomized experiment), we asked the
same set of users to use the same set of passwords that they
used in the first experiment and experimented with random-
ized keyboards that are rendered on the terminal. We use
the same number of users and trials per user as in the pre-
vious case study. At each time, a random keyboard layout
is generated, and the user is allowed to input his password
to the system using mouse clicks. We note that this exper-
iment resembles similar techniques used for defending key-
loggers (see section 1). Same as in the previous experiment,
we measure the time it takes each user to input the password
using this method. We find that the average success rate is
100% with 4 characters passwords and 94% with 8 charac-
ters passwords. We plot the empirical CDF in Figure 12 (the
right side is for 4 characters and the left side is for 8 charac-
ters case) of the time measurements. We find that the mean,
min, max, and median (in seconds) are 9.37, 3, 42, and 8 for
length 4 and 14.73, 6, 46, and 14 for length 8 passwords, re-
spectively. We note that, at average, the time it takes to input
passwords using this method is twice as much as when using
the qwerty keypad.
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Figure 8: Empirical CDF of the time it takes for in-
putting passwords of two different lengths. The to-
tal number of trials are 200 obtained from 20 users.
The keyboard used for input is the a randomized An-
droid phone keyboard (same keyboard is rendered on the
smartphone and terminal).
Case study 3—Our protocol. In this experiment, we use
a fully functioning implementation of our first protocol to
demonstrate its usability aspects. We use the same settings
as in the prior two experiments. In particular, the same sets
of passwords with the previous control groups are used in
this experiment. In our protocol, at each time a simulated
server introduces a randomized keyboard to the user encoded
into a QR barcode and encrypted as explained in section 3.
The user is asked to input his password on the terminal’s
keyboard using mouse clicks with the help of the keyboard
on the smartphone. Each user repeats that for 10 times, and
at each time the server generates a new keyboard. We further
account for all processing and computations in our protocols
by timing the overall login process. We measure the overall
login time since the server introduces the randomized key-
board till the user logs in (or being rejected for password
mismatch). Same as before, we measure the response time
even when the login fails for password mismatch. For that,
we notice that the average achieved success rate with our
protocol for login is 98.5% for 4 characters passwords and
96% for 8 characters passwords case. We notice that our
system achieves a comparable success rate to that of both
control groups supporting its usability.
Same as before, we plot an empirical CDF of the time
measurements in Figure 9 (detailed statistics and subjects are
inTable 2). The time measured in both figures includes the
total time it takes for cryptographic operations, encoding,
decoding, communication (negligible), and user response.
We notice that our system is practical compared to the other
case studies, since the mean, minimum, maximum, and me-
dian times it takes (in seconds) are 20.745, 10, 53, and 19.5
with 4 characters password and 29.81, 15, 52, and 28 with
8 characters (the mean ±1.38 sec for confidence interval of
10
95%). Compared to the two other case studies, which do
not provide the same security guarantees of our protocol, we
find that our protocol takes at average twice as much as the
randomized keyboard method and roughly four times (about
fives times for passwords with length 4) as much as the nor-
mal method (case study 1) both passwords lengths.
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Figure 9: Empirical CDF of the time it takes for in-
putting passwords of two different lengths in our first
protocol. The total number of trials are 200 obtained
from 20 users.
Table 2: Results of the user study with our protocol. t(4)
and t(8) are the average time (in seconds) for each user
(row) to input a password of the given length. The key-
board on the smartphone is re-randomized at each time.
t(4) success t(8) success gender (age)
25.2 •••••••••• 44.5 •••••••••◦ male (32)
27.6 •••••••••• 37.6 •••••••••• male (31)
21.1 •••••••••• 29.7 •••••••••• male (29)
18.5 •••••••••• 24.9 •••••••••• male (30)
25.3 •••••••••• 39.3 •••••••••• male (29)
14.8 •••••••••• 23.6 •••••••••◦ male (27)
16.9 •••••••••• 30.6 •••••••••• male (28)
16.8 •••••••••• 23.6 •••••••••• male (30)
13.1 •••••••••• 34.4 •••••••••• male (24)
24.6 •••••••••• 39.9 •••••••••• male (29)
28.1 •••••••••• 30.5 •••••••••• male (27)
23.0 •••••••••◦ 31.4 •••••••••• male (29)
23.0 •••••••••• 18.7 •••••••••• male (25)
20.0 •••••••••• 26.5 •••••••••• female (23)
24.1 •••••••••• 25.2 •••••••••• male (29)
24.0 •••••••••• 26.7 ••••••••◦◦ male (31)
18.3 •••••••••◦ 25.7 •••••••••• male (29)
16.9 •••••••••◦ 35.0 ••••••••◦◦ male (27)
16.7 •••••••••• 24.1 ••••••••◦◦ male (30)
16.9 •••••••••• 25.9 •••••••••• male (30)
20.7 98.5% 29.9 96% 1:19 (28.7)
7. RELATED WORK
There has been a large body of work on the problem of
user authentication in general [29, 35, 26, 33, 40], and in the
context of e-banking as well. Of special interest are authen-
tication protocols that use graphical passwords like those re-
ported in [42, 12, 43, 18] and attacks on them reported in [10,
20, 15, 25, 18, 34]. To the best of our knowledge, our pro-
tocols are the first of their own types to use visualization for
improving security and usability of authentication protocols
as per the way reported in this paper.
A closely related work is “Seeing-is-Believing” (SiB) [31]
(extended in [32]), which uses visual channels of 2D bar-
codes to resist man-in-the-middle attack in device pairing.
Though we utilize similar tools by using the 2D barcodes for
information representation, and the visual channel for com-
municating this information, our protocols are further more
generic than those proposed in [31]. Our protocols are tai-
lored to the problem settings in hand, e-banking, with a dif-
ferent trust and attack model than that used in [31]—which
results into different guarantees as explained earlier in this
paper. To prevent against phishing, Parno et al. suggested
the use of trusted devices to perform mutual authentication
and eliminate reliance on perfect user behavior [36].
Slightly touched upon in this paper are keyloggers as po-
tential attacks for credentials stealing, which are reported
in [19, 21, 39], and other malware which are reported in [41,
45]. In this paper we have shown that our protocols are se-
cure even when one of the participants in the authentication
process (the terminal or smartphone) is compromised.
8. CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we propose and analyze the use of user-
driven visualization to improve security and user-friendliness
of authentication protocols. Although tailored for e-banking,
and high security environments, they can also be used in
other contexts. Moreover, we have shown three realizations
of protocols that not only improve the user experience but
also resist challenging attacks, such as the keylogger attack,
the shoulder-surfing attack, and the malware attacks. Our
protocols utilize simple technologies available in most out-
of-the-box smartphone devices. Furthermore, we developed
Android application of a prototype of our protocol demon-
strates its feasibility and potential in real-world deployment
and operational settings for user authentication.
Our work indeed opens the door for several other direc-
tions that we would like to investigate as a future work. First,
we plan to investigate the design of other protocols with
more stringent performance requirements using the same tools
provided in this work. In addition, we will study methods
for improving the security and user experience by means of
visualization in other contexts, but not limited to authentica-
tion. Finally, reporting on user studies that will benefit from
a wide deployment and acceptance of our protocols would
be a parallel future work to consider as well.
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APPENDIX
A. EXPERIMENTS
Here we report on the case studies and the time measure-
ments, so of which are reported in section 6. To character-
ize the time measurements, we use boxplots, which capture
the the 5%, 95% maximum, mean, first and second quar-
tiles, and the outliers of measurements. Outliers are mea-
surements that are 1.4 times the 95% maximum or 1.4 times
the 5% minimum.
Case study 1. The boxplot of the raw time measures (per
subject) is shown in Figure 10(a) for 4 characters case and in
Figure 10(b) for 8 characters case. More measurements, the
passwords, and error rates are shown in Table 3.
Case study 2. The boxplot of the raw time measures (per
subject) is shown in Figure 11(a) for 4 characters case and in
Figure 11(b) for 8 characters case. More measurements, the
passwords, and error rates are shown in Table 4.
Case study 3. The boxplot of the raw time measures (per
subject) is shown in Figure 12(a) for 4 characters case and in
Figure 12(b) for 8 characters case. More measurements, the
passwords, and the raw error rates are shown in Table 5.
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Figure 10: Boxplot of the different measurements of the
users response time when inputting different passwords
with length 4 and 8 characters with the case study 1.
The boxplot captures the maximum (top 95%), the min-
imum (lowest 5%), the median, the first and third quar-
tiles (medians of the first and second halves of the popu-
lation). Note the circles are outliers (more than 1.4 times
the maximum)
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Figure 11: Boxplot of the different measurements of the
users response time when inputting different passwords
with length 4 and 8 characters with the case study 2.
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Table 3: Results of the user study with qwerty keypad.
The time is the average time per 10 trials (in seconds)
for each user (row) to input the password. The keyboard
on the smartphone is re-randomized at each time. The
success is computed out of 10 trials per each user.
pwd (4) time success pwd (8) time success
t4pw 9.4 10 aplegw2j 8.2 9
data 4.2 9 keywords 7.2 9
code 4.4 9 asdfnews 6.4 10
usa8 6 10 microarm 10.4 8
head 4.1 10 networks 8.8 4
1213 4.6 10 jjae1213 6.4 10
1596 4.2 9 mbc2356z 6.5 10
4455 2.5 10 dd4455ee 3.8 10
2222 3 10 78061622 8.5 10
1317 2.9 9 ucsl1317 6.1 8
bhnj 3.7 10 1116baek 6.3 10
1317 3.4 9 12341317 5.4 7
712 4.2 10 88061100 5.4 10
aple 4.8 10 hjh37267 6 9
save 2.9 10 20110714 5.5 9
cola 2.7 10 cocacola 5.2 10
asdf 3.6 9 19830325 7.2 10
503 4.2 9 babosmjk 7.3 9
u137 5.4 9 coffee20 8.3 10
uku0 4 10 terminal 7.3 10
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Figure 12: Boxplot of the different measurements of the
users response time when inputting different passwords
with length 4 and 8 characters in protocol’s experiment.
Table 4: Results of the user study with the randomized
keyboard. The time is the average time per 10 trials (in
seconds) for each user (row) to input the password. The
keyboard on the smartphone is re-randomized at each
time. The success is computed out of 10 trials per each
user.
pwd (4) time success pwd (8) time success
t4pw 13.9 10 aplegw2j 18.8 9
data 13 10 keywords 18.9 9
code 10.1 10 asdfnews 22.3 10
usa8 10.2 10 microarm 13.2 10
head 13.3 10 networks 24 10
1213 6.7 10 jjae1213 10.8 9
1596 6.6 10 mbc2356z 14.4 7
4455 4.1 10 dd4455ee 9.4 10
2222 5 10 78061622 10.7 10
1317 5.5 10 ucsl1317 15.1 10
bhnj 10.1 10 1116baek 18.4 9
1317 5.5 10 12341317 8.6 9
712 6.1 10 88061100 8.4 10
aple 11.2 10 hjh37267 11.4 10
save 10.1 10 20110714 11.1 7
cola 9.3 10 cocacola 16.1 10
asdf 23.4 10 19830325 17.3 10
503 5.3 10 babosmjk 16 10
u137 9.4 10 coffee20 11.4 9
uku0 8.6 10 terminal 18.3 10
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Table 5: Results of the user study with our protocol. The
time is the average time per 10 trials (in seconds) for each
user (row) to input the password. The keyboard on the
smartphone is re-randomized at each time. The success
is computed out of 10 trials per each user.
pwd (4) time success pwd (8) time success
t4pw 25.2 10 aplegw2j 42.9 9
data 27.6 10 keywords 37.6 10
code 21.1 10 asdfnews 29.7 10
usa8 18.5 10 microarm 24.9 10
head 25.3 10 networks 39.3 10
1213 14.8 10 jjae1213 23.6 9
1596 16.9 10 mbc2356z 30.6 10
4455 16.8 10 dd4455ee 23.6 10
2222 13.1 10 78061622 34.4 10
1317 24.6 10 ucsl1317 39.9 10
bhnj 28.1 10 1116baek 30.5 10
1317 23 9 12341317 31.4 10
712 23 10 88061100 18.7 10
aple 20 10 hjh37267 26.5 10
save 24.1 10 20110714 25.2 10
cola 24 10 cocacola 26.7 8
asdf 18.3 9 19830325 25.7 10
503 16.9 9 babosmjk 35 8
u137 16.7 10 coffee20 24.1 8
uku0 16.9 10 terminal 25.9 10
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